Abstract-Two effective attacks, namely de-synchronization attack and impersonation attack, against Ha et al. 's LCSS RFID authentication protocol, Song and Mitchell's protocol are identified. The former attack can break the synchronization between the RFID reader and the tag in a single protocol run so that they can not authenticate each other in any following protocol run. The latter can impersonate a legal tag to spoof the RFID reader by extracting the ID of a specific tag during the authentication process. An impersonation attack against Chen et al.'s RFID authentication scheme is also identified. By sending malicious queries to the tag and collecting the response messages emitted by the tag, the attack allows an adversary to extract the secret information from the tag and further to impersonate the legal tag.
I. INTRODUCTION
RFID (Radio Frequency Identification) technology is fast gaining popularity and attracting interest from both the industry and academic institutes. This technology has been applied to many applications such as object tracking and monitoring, supply-chain management [1] .
An RFID system consists of three parts: RFID tags, an RFID reader, and back-end database. Security requirements for RFID authentication protocol include authentication, untraceability and availability.
Authentication: Authentication is the process whereby one party is assured of the identity of a second party involved in a protocol, and that the second has actually participated. Spoofing is an attack on authentication.
Untraceability: Untraceability is the most important security requirement for user privacy [2] . Untraceability is the property that adversary can not trace tag by using interactions with tag. This concept means ID anonymity and indistinguishability.
Availability: Authentication should be available all the time between reader and tags. Authentication protocol should provide the data recovery against the data loss or falsification such as DoS, message hijacking, power interruption, etc. during the authentication processes. Especially, the de-synchronization attack by utilizing a man-in-the-middle attack must be prevented.
In [3] , Rhee et al. proposed a challenge-response authentication protocol based on a hash function. However, the computational load on the back-end database is heavy when authenticating a tag. Another disadvantage of Rhee et al. ' s protocols is that the protocols do not satisfy forward security. The RFID mutual authentication scheme presented by Lee et al. [4] introduces forward security based on synchronized secret information. However, Lee et al.'s protocol also requires many computational operations in the back-end database when finding a specific tag's ID. In [5] , Ha et al. proposed a low-cost and strong-security (LCSS) authentication protocol for an RFID system. The main contribution of Ha et al.'s protocol is low computation in back-end database. In the case of de-synchronization between the back-end database and a tag, the protocol is able to recover the synchronization. As the correct ID can be found based on just comparing the transmitted hash message and the hashed values in the database, the computational load on the back-end system is efficient compared with Rhee and Lee et al.'s protocols.
Numerous authentication protocols for RFID systems were proposed in an attempt to provide privacy and security. Many of these attempts fail to enforce anonymity and offer only weak authentication and some fail under denial of service [6] [7] . To secure RFID systems, various lightweight RFID schemes have been designed, where mostly hash functions and random number generators are involved. In [8] , Song and Mitchell proposed a scheme that significantly reduces the necessary storage and computation in a tag by comparison with previous hash-based schemes. The ultralightweight schemes only involve simple bit-wise operations on tags [9] [10] . However, de-synchronization attack, full-disclosure attack and tracing attack against such schemes have been reported [11] [12] . In [13] , Chou et al. presented a simple scheme based on quadratic residue assumption. This scheme is much cheaper than the implementation of a hash function. Hsiang demonstrated that Chou et al.'s scheme is vulnerable to the masquerading attack and the parallel session attack [14] . Recently, Chen et al. proposed a new efficient scheme based on quadratic residues and claimed that the new scheme not only achieves the mutual authentication between the server and the tag but also can satisfy all the security requirements needed in an RFID system [15] .
In this paper, we analyze the security vulnerabilities of the LCSS protocol [5] and the Song-Mitchell protocol [8] . In [5] and [8] , the authors presented some security analysis and claimed that their protocol is secure against de-synchronization attack and spoofing attack. In the following sections, we will show that the claims unfortunately don't hold. We also identify an impersonation attack against Chen et al.'s RFID authentication protocol [15] . By sending malicious queries to the tag and collecting the response messages emitted by the tag, our attack allows an adversary to extract the secret information from the tag and further to impersonate the legal tag. Fig. 1 shows the process of the proposed protocol, and the following is a detailed description of each step:
II. CRYPTANALYSIS OF THE LCSS PROTOCOL

A. Review of the LCSS protocol
1. The R broadcasts to the tags with a Query and a random number R R as a challenge.
2. The T generates a random number R T and computes P differently according to the state of SYNC. If SYNC is 0, then P=H(ID), otherwise P=H(ID||R T ||R R ). And then sets SYNC as 1. The T transmits P and R T to the R as a response to Query.
3. The R forwards the P and R T message received from the T together with R R generated by itself in step 1 to the DB. Figure 1 The LCSS protocol 4 . As soon as the DB receives the message from the R, it searches for the specific tag via the received P. Firstly, the DB finds whether there is a record's HID value equivalent to the received P. If so, the DB regards the record's ID value as the identity of the T, which is requesting authentication. This is the general case when the previous session is terminated normally.
When the DB cannot find any record's HID value equivalent to P in the first search, the value of H(ID||R T ||R R ) will be computed for all the ID in the database, with which compares the P.
However, if the DB cannot find the exact ID of the tag in the two above cases, it will compute the value of H(PID||R T ||R R ) for all the PID in the database then compares it with the P.
If the DB is still unable to find the tag's ID in all the three above cases, it halts the search for the ID and orders the R to query again.
The R will be authenticated successfully as a legal one, as soon as the DB does find the ID or PID in one of the three searching cases. Then the DB updates ID with the value of H(PID||R R ) and computes HI = H(ID) for the next session. Finally, computes Q= H(PID||R T ) and transmits it to the R.
5. The R forwards the message Q to the T. 6. The T verifies the correctness of Q by checking whether it is equivalent to the value of H(ID||R T ). If so, the T updates its ID with the value of H(ID||R R ), then sets the SYNC state as 0. Fig. 2 depicts the message transmission of the desynchronization attack. The detailed steps are as follows:
B. Desynchronization Attack
1. The attacker can eavesdrop in the insecure channel. When the reader R broadcasts a Query with a random number R R to the tags, the attacker can obtain R R , changes it to R A . Then, sends the Query with R A to the targeted tag.
2. We can suppose that the system is working normally now, that is, the SYNC state of the targeted tag T is 0, the T computes P=H(ID) and transmits it to the R with random number R T .
3. The R forwards the message received from the T to the DB together with the random number R R generated by itself.
4. The DB receives the P=H(ID), it does find a record's HID equivalent to P, then assigns the value of ID to PID. After performing these computations
and PID=H(ID), the DB transmits the Q to the R.
5. The R directly forwards the Q received from the DB to the T.
6. As the T receives the Q equivalent to the value of H(ID||R T ), the ID in the tag will be updated with the value of H(ID||R A ), SYNC state changes into 0. We can note that the ID's value in the T is not equivalent to that in the DB. It seems like that the system has successfully completed a protocol run, actually, it is already trapped into de-synchronization permanently.
Now the value of ID in the DB is ID DB =H(ID||R R ), the value of ID in the T is another value ID T = H(ID||R A ). When the T transmits P=H(ID T ) to the R, which will be
forwards to the DB. After the DB searching all the database records in all the three cases, it will not be able find a proper match for the P received from the R. Consequently, the authentication of the legal tag, in which the ID is updated under the above presented desynchronization attack, will be halted. In the next protocol run, the tag will respond with P=H(ID T ||R T ||R R ) and R T . DB will still not be able find a proper match for the P in all the three cases. 
C. Impersonation attack
The detailed attack includes two stages: Stage 1. Supposing the system is working normally right now. An adversary sends a malicious query to a targeted tag with a Query and a random number R A , then collects the response messages P=H(ID) and R T emitted by the tag.
Stage 2 is described as follows: 1. The attacker eavesdrops in the insecure channel, collecting the broadcasting Query message. Obviously, the random number R R generated by the R can be obtained by the attacker. Therefore, the attacker is capable to impersonate the tag T transmit the message including P=H(ID) and the random number R R as a response to the R.
2. The R forwards the message containing P=H(ID) and R R to the DB together with the random number R R generated by itself. Of course, the two random numbers are same.
3. The DB searches a record in the database to match the P=H(ID) received from the R. And then updates PID with the value of ID. After performing these computations
and PID=H(ID), the DB transmits the Q to the R. We note that the new ID and the Q are equivalent to each other.
4. The R directly forwards the Q received from the DB to the T. So the attacker is capable to obtain the message Q, namely the new ID of the T.
From what mentioned above, we can see that the attacker is able to own the new ID in the T. So the attacker is capable to disguise as a legitimate tag to spoof the R and update the ID during the next session. Fig. 3 depicts the message transmission of the spoofing attack. In the case of the de-synchronization attack, where random number R R in protocol step 1 is replaced with R A due to an malicious attacker, the database can not detect this attack in protocol step 4 because of lack integrity check on R R . In the case of the spoofing attack, where random number R T in protocol step 2 is replaced with R R , the database can not detect this attack in protocol step 4 because of lack authentication on the tag in the case of SYNC=0.
We can add message authentication code M=H(R T ||ID||R R ) in protocol step 2 to protect the system from de-synchronization attack and spoofing attack. If the attacker replaces R T with R A in step 2, the DB will detect this attack by check the validity of the value M. If the attacker replaces R T with R R in step 2, the attacker will unable to generate M= H(R R ||ID||R R ) to respond to Query. Illustration of the message transmission of the improved protocol is depicted as Fig. 4 . 
x<<k: Left circular shift operator, which rotates all bits of x to the left by k bits. (u i(new) ).
5. The reader forwards M 3 to T i .
T i computes u i ← M 3 ⊕(r 2 >>l/2) and checks that h(u i )= t i . If the check succeeds, the tag has authenticated the server, and sets t i ← h((u i <<l/4)⊕( t i >>l/4) ⊕ r 1 ⊕r 2 ).
If the check fails, the tag keeps the current value of t i unchanged.
We note M 3 ⊕(M 1 >>l/2)= u i ⊕( t i >>l/2). 
B. Impersonation Attack
In [8] , the authors claimed that their scheme is robust to tag impersonation attack based on the idea that the adversary cannot compute a valid response (M 1 , M 2 ) without knowledge of t i . However, if the adversary attacks the system by the following way, the protocol will show its vulnerability to the impersonation attack although the adversary does not know t i . The detailed attack includes two stages:
Collection stage: Supposing the system is working normally right now. An adversary sends a malicious query to a targeted tag with a random number r 1 , then collects the response messages M 1 and M 2 emitted by the tag, where r 2 ∈ R {0,1} l , M 1 =t i ⊕r 2 and M 2 =f t i (r 1 ⊕r 2 ). In the impersonation stage, the adversary will replay M 2 .
Impersonation stage: After collecting the response messages M 1 and M 2 , the adversary can modify the data, and then replay the messages to masquerade as the legal tag.
Server
Reader Tag (u i(new) ).
5. The reader forwards M 3 ' to the adversary. In the step 4, we prove that the server will authenticate the tag. We have 
C. De-synchronization Attack
To provide privacy protection, most RFID authentication schemes update tag's secret information after a successful protocol run. This update is performed in the back-end database as well as in the tag. So synchronization of secret information between the database and the tag is crucial for subsequent authentications. Some kinds of protocol malfunctions might leave the both sides in a un-synchronization state. The de-synchronization attack, to be introduced below, is a malicious action by an attacker which intentionally causes the database and a tag out of synchronization. Fig.  7 depicts the message transmission of the desynchronization attack.
The detailed steps are as follows: Figure 7 De-synchronization attack Adversary Tag
1. Supposing the system is working normally right now. The server stores the entries [(u 
for every tag and the tag stores the value of t i . We have (u i(new) ). Based the tag impersonation attack described in section 2.2, the adversary first impersonates the tag to spoof the server and record M 1 and M 3 . We note M 3 ⊕(M 1 >>l/2)= u i(new) ⊕(t i(new) >>l/2). After authenticating the adversary, the server updates its secrets.
2. Now the adversary disguises as a legitimate reader to spoof the tag and update the tag's secret. The adversary generates a random bit-string r 1 '∈ R {0,1}
l and sends it to T i .
3. The tag T i generates a random bit-string r 2 '∈ R {0,1} l , and computes M 1 '=t i ⊕r 2 ' and M 2 '=f t i (r 1 '⊕r 2 '). T i then sends M 1 ' and M 2 ' to the reader.
4. The adversary sends
and checks that h(u i )= t i . If the check succeeds, the tag has authenticated the server, and sets
We prove that in step 5 the tag will accept M 3 '.
After the tag updates its secret information t i using two random bit-strings r 1 ' and r 2 ', the RFID system will be involved in DoS state and can not provide availability.
IV. CRYPTANALYSIS OF CHEN ET AL.'S PROTOCOL
A. Review of Chen et al.'s Protocol
There are two phases in Chen et al's scheme: an initialization phase and an authentication phase.
In the initialization phase, the server generates two large primes p and q, and computes n = pq. It also chooses a one-way hash function, h(), and a pseudorandom number generator, PRNG(). The value of n and h(), PRNG() are both made public. The server chooses a random number r ∈ Z n and writes TID, h(TID) and r into tag's memory, where TID may include EPC codes depending on the user's specification. Meanwhile, the server saves <h(TID), TID, r, r old > into its database, where r old = r at the beginning.
The authentication phase of Chen et al's scheme is described as follows. It is also illustrated in Fig. 8 . Step 1. The reader chooses a random challenge s ∈ Z n and broadcasts a hello message together with s to the tag.
Step 2. After receiving the hello message and challenge s, the tag reads TID, h(TID) and r from its memory and computes x = h(TID) ⊕ r ⊕ s, X = x 2 mod n, and R = r 2 mod n. The tag responses <X, R, h(x), h(r)> to the reader.
Step 3. After receiving tag's response <X, R, h(x), h(r)>, the reader forwards this response together with s to the server. 
1. Solves X = x 2 mod n and R = r 2 mod n , getting (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , x 4 ) and (r 1 , r 2 , r 3 , r 4 Step 4. After receiving <X, R, h(x), h(r), s>, the server solves X = x 2 mod n and R = r 2 mod n by using Chinese Remainder Theorem, obtaining four roots (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , x 4 ) and (r 1 , r 2 , r 3 , r 4 ) respectively. It then compares h(x i ) with h(x) and h(r i ) with h(r), for i = 1 to 4, to determine the unique values of x and r. The server then computes x ⊕ r ⊕ s, obtaining h(TID). Having obtained h(TID), the server uses it as a searching key to find the tag record in its database. If it is not found, the server will abort the session; otherwise, it verifies whether the solved r is equal to the value of r or r old stored in the found record. If it is, the server will compute x ack = TID ⊕ r and then sends the acknowledgement message h(x ack ) to the tag through the reader. Simultaneously, the server updates the tag's record by replacing r old with r, and r with PRNG(r).
Step 5. After receiving the server/reader's h(x ack ), the tag verifies whether h(TID ⊕ r) is equal to the received h(x ack ). If so, the tag updates r with PRNG(r).
B. Impersonation Attack
An important observation of Chen et al.'s scheme is that if the adversary could compute the secret value h(TID)⊕r then the adversary could impersonate the legal tag. By utilizing responses from a tag, an adversary may try to get knowledge of the tag. Fig. 9 depicts the message transmission of the impersonation attack. The detail impersonation attack is described as follows.
Step 1. Supposing the system is working normally right now. The adversary chooses a random challenge s 1 ∈ Z n and sends a hello message together with s 1 to the tag. The tag responds the message < X 1 , R, h(x 1 ), h(r)>. The adversary records this message. We have:
Step 2. The adversary computes s 2 = s 1 ⊕I, where I=[000…001] (set the least significant bit as 1). The adversary sends a hello message together with s 2 to the tag. The tag responds the message < X 2 , R, h(x 2 ), h(r)>. The adversary records this message. We have:
Step 3. The adversary sends a random number s 3 , and records the responding message < X 3 , R, h(x 3 ), h(r)>. We have
Step 4. After obtaining X 1 and X 2 , the adversary can recover two candidate secrets of h(TID)⊕r, and then can check the validity through the equation (5) .
From equation (1), (2), (3) and (4), we have X 2 = (x 2 ) 2 mod n= (h(TID) ⊕ r ⊕ s 2 ) 2 mod n= (h(TID) ⊕ r ⊕ s 1 ⊕I) 2 mod n = (x 1 ⊕I) 2 mod n If the least significant bit of x 1 is 0 then X 2 = (x 1 +1) 2 mod n = X 1 + 2x 1 +1 mod n. We can obtain x 1 = (X 2 -X 1 -1)(n+1)/2 mod n. Let k 1 denote the first candidate of h(TID) ⊕r, we have k 1 = (X 2 -X 1 -1)(n+1)/2 mod n ⊕ s 1 .
If the least significant bit of x 1 is 1 then X 2 = (x 1 -1) 2 mod n = X 1 -2x 1 +1 mod n. We can obtain x 1 = (X 1 - 
, R, h(x 2 ), h(r)
Computes s 2 = s 1 ⊕ I Computes k 1 = (X 2 -X 1 -1)(n+1)/2 mod n ⊕ s 1 Computes k 2 = (X 1 -X 2 +1)(n+1)/2 mod n ⊕ s 1 hello, s 3 x 3 = h(TID) ⊕ r ⊕ s 3 X 3 = (x 3 ) 2 mod n R = r 2 mod n X 3 , R, h(x 3 ), h(r)
Chooses s 3 If X 3 = (k 1 ⊕ s 3 ) 2 mod n then h(TID) ⊕ r = k 1 else h(TID) ⊕ r = k 2 Impersonates the tag using the disclosed value h(TID) ⊕ r and the recorded values R, h(r). X 2 +1)(n+1)/2 mod n. Let k 2 denote the second candidate of h(TID)⊕r, we have k 2 = (X 1 -X 2 +1)(n+1)/2 mod n ⊕ s 1 .
We denote the value of h(TID)⊕r by k. Now we determine which one of two candidates is the value of h(TID)⊕r through the equation (5) . If X 3 = (k 1 ⊕ s 3 ) 2 mod n then k = k 1 else k = k 2 .
Step 5. Once the adversary obtains the value of h(TID) ⊕ r, he can impersonate the tag using h(TID) ⊕ r and the recorded values R, h(r). When the reader chooses a random challenge s ∈ Z n and broadcasts a hello message together with s. The adversary computes x = k ⊕ s, X = x 2 mod n. The adversary responses to the reader with <X, R, h(x), h(r)> and will be authenticated by the reader.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have identified two effective attacks, namely impersonation attack and de-synchronization attack, against the LCSS protocol and the Song-Mitchell RFID authentication protocol. We also have identified an impersonation attack against Chen et al.'s RFID authentication scheme. These attacks should be considered in the designing the new RFID authentication protocol.
